3463. That the servants of Isaac came. That this signifies rational things, is evident from the signification of "servants," as being rational things and memory-knowledges (n. 2567) and from the representation of Isaac, as being the Lord as to the Divine rational (n. 1893, 2066, 2072, 2083, 2630, 3012, 3194, 3210). From what goes before it is evident what of the Lord is here represented by Isaac, namely, the Word as to its internal sense; for by "Abimelech, Ahuzzath, and Phicol" are signified the doctrinal things of faith which are from the literal sense of the Word, such as are the doctrinal things of those who are called "Philistines" in a good sense, that is, those who are solely in the doctrinal things of faith, and as to life are in good, but in the good of truth, which doctrinal things have some conjunction with the internal sense, thus with the Lord.
 For they who are solely in the doctrinal things of faith, and in a life according to them, are in a certain conjunction, but a remote one, for the reason that they do not know from any affection what charity toward the neighbor is, and still less what love to the Lord is, but only from a certain idea of faith; thus neither are they in any perception of good, but in a species of persuasion that what their doctrinal things dictate is true and thus good, and when they are confirmed in these doctrinal things, they may be in what is false equally as in what is true; for nothing but good confirms a man in regard to what is truth. Truth indeed teaches what good is, but without perception; whereas good teaches what truth is from perception.
 Everyone may know how this is, and also what is the nature and quality of the difference, merely from this common precept of charity:
All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them (Matt. 7:12).
He who acts from this precept does indeed do what is good to others, but because it is so commanded, thus not from the affection of the heart; and whenever he does it, he begins from himself, and also in doing good thinks of merit; whereas he who does not act from precept, but from charity, that is, from affection, acts from the heart, and thus from freedom; and whenever he acts, he begins from really willing what is good, thus for the reason that it is delightful to him; and as he has recompense in the delight, he does not think of merit.
 From this then can be seen what the difference is between doing good from faith, and doing good from charity; and that those who do good from faith are more remote from good itself which is the Lord than those who do it from charity; neither can the former be easily introduced into the good of charity so far as to have a perception of it, because they are but little in truths; for no one can be introduced into this good unless things not true are first eradicated, which is impossible while such things are inrooted even to persuasion.