3679. And Esau saw that Isaac blessed Jacob. That this signifies the thought of natural good concerning conjunction through the good of truth which is "Jacob," is evident from the signification of "seeing," as being to think; for thinking is nothing else than seeing inwardly, or internal sight; and from the representation of Esau, as being the good of the natural (see n. 3300, 3302, 3322, 3494, 3504, 3576, 3599); from the signification of being "blessed," as being conjunction (n. 3504, 3514, 3530, 3565, 3584); from the representation of Isaac, as being the Lord's Divine rational as to Divine good (treated of above); and from the representation of Jacob, as being the good of truth (n. 3669, 3677). From all this it is evident that by "Esau saw that Isaac blessed Jacob," is signified the thought of natural good concerning conjunction through the good of truth.
 What is meant by the thought of natural good concerning conjunction through the good of truth cannot be fully explained to the apprehension, but yet must be briefly explained. The thought of natural good is the thought of the rational or internal man within the natural or external man, and indeed from the good of the latter; for it is the rational or internal man which thinks, and not the natural or external man; the former, or internal man, is in the light of heaven, in which light there is intelligence and wisdom from the Lord (n. 3195, 3339, 3636, 3643); but the external man is in the light of the world, in which there is no intelligence, and not even life; and therefore unless the internal man were to think within the external, it would not be possible to think at all. And yet thought appears to man to be in his external man, inasmuch as he thinks from those things which have entered in by the senses and are of the world.
 The case is the same as with the sight of the eye. The sensuous man supposes that the eye sees of itself, when yet the eye is merely an organ of the body by which the internal man sees those things which are out of the body, or which are in the world. It is also the same as with speech. The sensuous man would suppose that the mouth and tongue speak of themselves; and they who think somewhat more deeply, that the larynx and interior organs speak by breath from the lungs; when yet it is the thought which speaks by means of these organs, for speech is nothing but thought speaking. There are many such fallacies of the senses. The case is the same in regard to all apparent life in the external man in that it is the life of the internal man therein as in its material and corporeal organ.
 With respect to thought, the case is this: So long as man lives in the body he thinks from the rational in the natural, but with a difference accordingly as the natural corresponds to the rational, or does not so correspond. When the natural corresponds, the man is rational, and thinks spiritually; but when the natural does not correspond, the man is not rational, nor can he think spiritually; for with the man whose natural corresponds to his rational the communication is opened, so that the light of heaven from the Lord can flow in through the rational into the natural, and enlighten it with intelligence and wisdom; hence the man becomes rational and thinks spiritually. But with the man whose natural does not correspond to the rational the communication is closed, and there only flows in somewhat of light in general round about, and through chinks through the rational into the natural; and the result is that the man is not rational, and does not think spiritually; for a man thinks according to the influx of the light of heaven that he enjoys. This shows that every man thinks according to the state of correspondence in respect to good and truth of the natural with the rational.
 But spirits and angels do not think in the same way as man; their thought is indeed also terminated in a natural, for they have with them all the natural memory and its affections, but are not allowed to use this memory (see n. 2475-2479); yet although they are not allowed to use it, it nevertheless serves them as a plane, or as a foundation, in order that the ideas of their thought may be terminated therein. Hence it is that the ideas of their thought are more interior, and their speech is not as with man from forms of words, but from forms of actual things; showing that their thought also is such as is the correspondence of their natural with their rational; and that there are spirits who are rational, who think spiritually, and also those who are not rational, who do not think spiritually; and this exactly in accordance with their affections and consequent thoughts of things in the life of the body; that is, with the state of life they had acquired in the world.
 From this it may in some measure appear what the thought of natural good is, namely, that it is thought in the good of the natural. According to the idea of spirits that is called the thought of natural good which according to the idea of men is called thought in the good of the natural. In this latter, that is, in the good of the natural, the rational thinks when it has regard to good as the end. Thus the thought of natural good concerning conjunction through the good of truth, is thought in the natural concerning the end, namely, how truth can be conjoined therewith; and this according to Divine order by the common way; which, as has often been said above, is from such things as are external, and thus which are the ultimate or last in order; for all the regeneration of the natural commences from these. These last or ultimate things are the first knowledges, such as are those of infants and children, concerning which see above (n. 3665).
 In the beginning the truth of good, which is "Esau," is not conjoined in the external form with the good of truth, which is "Jacob;" for the good of truth is inverse in respect to the truth of good (n. 3669); but still they are inmostly conjoined, that is, in respect to ends. For the end of the truth which is from good is that truths may be adjoined to it according to order; and this also is the end of the good which is from truth; and inasmuch as the end conjoins, therefore they are conjoined (n. 3562, 3565). The inverse of order is at first only a means that has respect to the end.